Global Forum on Agricultural Research GFAR was established initially by World Bank, IFAD, FAO, International Service for National Agricultural Research | ISNAR and SDC on 31 October 1996
GFAR stakeholders launched in March 2012 the Gender in Agriculture Partnership (GAP)
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GFAR was established initially by World Bank, IFAD, FAO, International Service for National Agricultural Research | ISNAR and SDC on 31 October 1996, triggered by a major shift in thinking about development during that period. This entailed a new recognition of the need to include all development stakeholders in development processes, to make them more effective, owned by the intended beneficiary countries and communities, self-driven and resilient.
Recognizing this shift, the United Nations inter-governmental agriculture and foodrelated development organizations FAO, IFAD, CGIAR partnership of 15 international agricultural research centres (IARCs), the national agricultural research and development systems of countries from South and North through their regional bodies and representatives of civil society, the private sector and farmer organizations, came together to establish GFAR.
The first gatherings for the stakeholders were the GFAR Triennial Conferences. The first was held in Dresden, Germany, in May 2000, on "Strengthening research partnerships in the globalized world of the turn of century". The second was held in Dakar, Senegal, in 2003 with the theme "Linking Research and Rural Innovation to Sustainable Development".
The third was held in New Delhi, India, in 2006 with the theme "Reorienting Agricultural Research to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)".
Subsequently, the meetings were replaced by Global Conferences on Agricultural Research for Development (GCARD) along with the Annual General Meetings of CGIAR
The Global Forum on Agricultural Research and Innovation (GFAR) is an inclusive global mechanism enabling all those concerned with the future of agriculture and its role in development around the world to come together and address key global needs. GFAR provides an open forum for stakeholders across the agricultural spectrum— from researchers and organizations to farmers—to participate in collaborative discussion and action around the current and future state of agriculture.
Established in 1996, GFAR was formed as a project for resource sharing—a commitment that remains the essential purpose of the Forum today. GFAR facilitates collaboration, partnerships and sharing of objectives along the complex pathways from research through to development outcomes
The Global Conference on Agricultural Research for Development has been created to promote effective, targeted investment and build partnership, capacities and mutual accountabilities at all levels of the agricultural system so as to ensure that today’s agricultural research will meet the needs of the resource-poor end user.
According to FAO, approximately 70% of all farmers in the developing world are women. If access to new technology, training and resources is made available to these farmers, yields could increase by 20 to 30% and could reduce the number of hungry people in world by 100 to 150 million people.
In order to tackle this issue, GFAR stakeholders launched in March 2012 the Gender in Agriculture Partnership (GAP) at the first Global Conference on Women in Agriculture (GCWA) in New Delhi, India.
GAP’s vision is to ensure a transformed agriculture where gender equity enables food, nutrition and income security for the rural poor
The National Institutional Ranking Framework (NIRF) was approved by the MHRD and launched by Honourable Minister of Human Resource Development on 29th September 2015.
This framework outlines a methodology to rank institutions across the country. The methodology draws from the overall recommendations broad understanding arrived at by a Core Committee set up by MHRD, to identify the broad parameters for ranking various universities and institutions. The parameters broadly cover “Teaching, Learning and Resources,” “Research and Professional Practices,” “Graduation Outcomes,” “Outreach and Inclusivity,” and “Perception”.
Trickeries of the money bill
The judgment in the tribunals case could have a profound bearing on India’s constitutional arrangements
The Supreme Court has now heard oral arguments in Revenue Bar Association (RBA) v. Union of India, in which the validity of the Finance Act of 2017, insofar as it affects the structure and functioning of various judicial tribunals, is under challenge. At first blush, a dispute over the apparent inscrutabilities of a tribunal’s working might strike us as uninteresting and, perhaps, even unimportant. But, as the RBA’s arguments show us, how the court decides the case will likely have a profound bearing on India’s constitutional arrangements.
Ordinarily, the Finance Act, which is enacted at the beginning of every accounting year, seeks to give effect to the government’s fiscal policies. In 2017, however, the state wielded the statute like a blunderbuss. It not only set the fiscal agenda for the year ahead but it also toppled the existing regime governing the working of 26 different judicial bodies. Until recently, each of these panels was governed by a separate statute, and those laws individually contained a set of principles providing for, among other things, the criteria employed to select and remove members to and from these bodies, and for salaries, allowances and other such service conditions of the members.
But, in one fell swoop, the Finance Act not only abolished some of the tribunals but also altogether repealed the standards provided in the different statutes. In their place, the law vested in the Central government an absolute, untrammelled power to make rules to effectively govern the operation of the tribunals.
The petitioners argued that this move runs sharply athwart judicial independence. The new law, in their belief, deputed to the executive what was really an essential legislative function.
Many of these tribunals, which included the National Green Tribunal (NGT), the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, and the Industrial Disputes Tribunal, they pointed out, performed roles that were originally undertaken by the higher judiciary.
To assign to the executive’s whims the task of establishing the criteria employed in selecting members to the panels and to provide for the members’ service conditions was, therefore, pernicious to the basic principle of separation of powers. Consider one of the consequences.
Despite the Supreme Court’s previous ruling that the chairperson of a judicial tribunal ought to be equivalent to the Chief Justice of the high courts, as a result of the rules now made in furtherance of the Finance Act, in 13 different tribunals, a person who is merely qualified to be appointed as a judge of a high court can be selected as the presiding officer.
The RBA’s case, though, goes beyond questions concerning delegation of power. Of equal concern is the enactment of these stipulations through the wangled mechanism of the Finance Act. Substantive matters concerning the governing of tribunals, one would think, can scarcely be considered as a fiscal measure. Yet the draft law which introduced these provisions was classified as a money bill, and the sanction of the Rajya Sabha was altogether dodged. Although this too might appear on first glimpse to be a quarrel over esoteric matters of procedure, the consequences are enormous, travelling, as they do, to the heart of India’s democratic apparatus.
The Need For The Minutiae
In B.R. Ambedkar’s vision, the Constitution embodied not only a charter of rights but also a foundation for republican governance. His worries that democracy in India was “only a top-dressing on an Indian soil, which is essentially undemocratic”, saw him lay stress on a need to diffuse constitutional morality among India’s citizens. Citing the classical historian, George Grote, while moving the draft Constitution on November 4, 1948, Ambedkar said constitutional morality had to be seen as representing “a paramount reverence for the forms of the Constitution”. Since such reverence had to be cultivated, he thought it imperative that the Constitution commend the minutiae of administration rather than leave such matters purely to the legislature’s wisdom. In the absence of such prescriptions, democracy, he feared, would wallow in decline.
The Constitution’s verbosity has been a source of antipathy to many. Too long, too rigid, too prolix, Sir Ivor Jennings, a preeminent British constitutional expert, reportedly said, of the document, in a lecture delivered at the University of Madras in 1951.
But only years later Jennings was lauding India for representing the region’s most successful constitutional experiment. This volte face, as it happened, was occasioned by those provisions of administrative intricacies, which Jennings had initially found so troubling, and which Ambedkar had thought indispensable. And it is those provisions that are today under siege.
One such clause, Article 110(1), grants to the Lok Sabha Speaker the authority to certify a draft law as a money bill so long as such legislation deals only with all or any of the matters specifically listed in the provision. These include subjects such as the imposition or abolition of a tax, the declaring of any expenditure to be expenditure charged on the Consolidated Fund of India, and, significantly, also any matter otherwise incidental to the subjects specified in Article 110.
The ensuing clause clarifies that a draft law will not be a money bill for the reason that it also provides for the imposition or abolition of a tax. In other words, substantive laws, which are not merely incidental to the subjects enlisted in Article 110(1) cannot be finagled into a bill that also happens to contain taxing rules. It is precisely such trickery that the petitioners contended the Finance Act of 2017 indulges in.
The Union government, for its part, argued that the Speaker of the Lok Sabha was not only correct in making the classification, but that, in any event, her decision was beyond judicial review. To this end, the government relied on Article 110(3), which states that in cases where a dispute arises over whether a bill is a money bill or not, the Speaker’s decision shall be considered final. But, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly held, the finality accorded to the Speaker’s decision does not altogether oust the court’s jurisdiction.
The irrevocability of such decisions operate only within the realm of Parliament. For the Constitution expressly vests in the Supreme Court and in the high courts the power to review governmental actions, and issue prerogative writs every time those actions exceed the Constitution’s remit.
Ultimately, the Speaker derives her power from the Constitution. In classifying a draft law as a money bill, therefore, her decision has to be demonstrably justifiable. An immunity from judicial scrutiny would effectively allow the government to elude the Rajya Sabha’s constitutional checks by simply having the Speaker classify a draft law as a money bill regardless of whether it, in fact, meets the conditions stipulated in Article 110(1) or not.
From A Parliamentary Custom
The idea behind a money bill is derived from British parliamentary custom. But unlike in Britain, where judicial review of the Speaker’s opinion is unambiguously prohibited, in India, Article 110 avoids creating any such bar.
Money bills exist simply to ensure that the Rajya Sabha isn’t allowed to bring down a government by refusing it access to the exchequer for everyday governance.
To use it as a means to nullify the Upper House’s democratic role in making substantive legislation denigrates the Constitution’s form which Ambedkar and the Constituent Assembly considered inviolate.
As the lawyer Gautam Bhatia wrote in these pages (“The imperial cabinet and an acquiescent court”, March 8, 2019), the Supreme Court has already squandered at least two opportunities in recent times to provide a sense of sanctity to the Constitution’s carefully structured arrangements. The dispute over the Finance Act of 2017, therefore, assumes particular significance. In deciding the case, the court will do well to pay heed to Ambedkar’s warnings, by recognising that the niceties of constitutional form are not a matter of trifles.